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POWERS AND PROCEDURES OF CITY
AND VILLAGE GOVERNING BOARDS
HARoLD D. SAvr*
N ORTH DAKOTA cities, unlike those in many states, do notN operate under special charters. They are created by general
laws enacted by the legislature. For villages, only one general law
is applicable. For cities, the inhabitants have several choices: they
may adopt the mayor and council plan, or the city commission plan,
or either of these plans with a city manager. Regardless of which
plan is adopted, the laws in effect at any given moment with ref-
erece to the powers, duties and limitations upon municipalities and
their officers are the source of all authority, for municipalities are
"mere creatures of the statute." '
Our municipal corporations are "political subdivisions of the
state, auxiliaries for the purpose of local government, exercising a
part of the powers of the state. They may be created, or, after
ireatibn, their powers may be restricted or enlarged or altogether
withdrawn at the will of the legislature."'
Although our constitution provides that the legislature shall pro-
vide for the organization of municipal corporations, restricting their
powers as to levying taxes and assessments, borrowing money and
contracting debts,3 the legislative power is plenary, and this con-
stitutional provision does not constitute a grant, but is a restriction
and limitation upon that plenary power.
4
Through the device of municipal corporations, a portion of the
legislative power of the state is delegated to local authorities. The
municipal corporation may be granted powers of government with-
in its limits as well as powers of regulation without its limits.'
NATURE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
It would be difficult to improve upon Dean Cooley's definition
of a municipal corporation: "The municipal corporation is a perfect
public corporation, established under and by virtue of a sovereign
act of legislation, uniting the people and land within a prescribed
* Member of the firm of Shaft, Benson, and Shaft. City Attorney, Grand Forks, N. Dak.
1. State ex rel Shaw v. Frazier, 39 N.D. 430, 167 N.W. 510 (1918).
2. State ex eel Linde v. Taylor, 33 N.D. 76, 156 N.W. 561 (1916).
3. N.D. Const. Art. VI, §130.
4. O'Laughlin v. Carlson, 30 N.D. 213, 152 N.W. 675 (1915); Martin v. Tyler,
4 N.D. 278, 60 N.W. 392 (1894).
5. Waslien v. Hiilsboro, 48 N.D. 1113, 188 N.W. 738 (1922).
NORTH DAKOTA.-LAW REVIEW
boundary into a body corporate and politic for the purposes of local
self-government, and invested with the powers necessary therefor."'
Perhaps it is unnecessary to add that Dean Cooley's use of the
word "perfect" was not intended to attribute any perfection to
municipal corporations or their officials, but to distinguish a perfect
public corporation from an imperfect or quasi-corporation, which is
invested with some but not all of the attributes of the public cor-
poration.
Within the limits of the authority constitutionally delegated to
them by the legislature, municipalities exercise a part of the sover-
eign power of the state. A municipal ordinance, within its author-
ized sphere and properly enacted, is on equal footing with a law
passed by the legislature, and has the same dignity and enforce-
ability with this important distinction: the legislature may at any
time appropriate to itself the right to legislate in the field covered
by the ordinance, or may deprive the municipality of the power to
legislate in that particular field or manner, and thereupon the ordi-
nance is of no further force or effect, even though it is not repealed
by the governing board.7
LIMITATIONS ON POWERS OF-GOVERNING BOARDS
Since municipalities are creatures of the legislature it is always
necessary that the governing board look to the law for its authority,
for it has no powers except those expressly or impliedly given it by
law.
Its authority is limited in two ways. First, the board can do only
that which it is expressly or impliedly authorized to do, and, second,
even those things it is authorized to do may be done only in the
manner prescribed by law. Thus, when any municipal action is
contemplated the first question must always be: "Has the legisla-
ture authorized this?" Having answered that question in the affirm-
ative, it then must be asked "Has the legislature stated how it must
be done?"
As long ago as 1875 the Territorial Supreme Court of Dakota
Territory laid down the following rules for the determination of
municipal power or authority in any given case:
"A municipal corporation possesses, and can exercise, the follow-
ing powers, and none others: First, those granted in express
words; second those ecessarily implied, or necessarily incident to
6. Cooley, Municipal Corporations 14 (1914).
7. Fargo v. Glaser, .62:N.P. 673, 24.4 N.W. 905 (1932).
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the powers expressly granted; third, those absolutely essential to
the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply
convenient, but indispensable; and any fair doubt as to the ex-
istence of a power is resolved, by the courts, against the corpora-
tion and the existence of the power."'
These general rules have never been departed from by the North
Dakota Supreme Court.9
There is no element of contract in the granting of powers by the
legislature to the municipalities. Powers given today may be taken
away tomorrow. Of course, the state may enter into a contract with
a municipality, the same as with any other corporation or person,
and it can not invalidate its contract by subsequent legislation.
Moreover, a municipality may enter into a contract pursuant to
statutory authority, and the legislature can not, by subsequent legis-
lation, invalidate that contract. But the power of a municipality to
act in aly given field or in any given manner may be given or taken
away at the pleasure of the legislature.",
Assuming that express or implied statutory authority to do the
thing is present, the means of carrying out that authority must be
determined. If there are no specific directions as to the manner or
method of proceeding, any means reasonably calculated to produce
the desired result may be used. 11 For instance, if for a specific type
of contract, the legislature has not seen fit to require competitive
bids, the governing board does not have to call for bids, but may
proceed in whatever way it, in good faith, deems to be for the best
interests of the, city."2 On the other hand, if the legislature has pre-
scribed the method or the procedure to be followed, the act must be
done in the prescribed way, or it is wholly invalid. A few illustra-
tions should serve to point up the importance of this proposition,
and the danger involved in slipshod methods of performing official
acts. If governing boards can be made to realize that many more
municipal acts are invalidated by the courts because of improper
procedure than because of lack of authority, municipalities could
be saved much litigation.
To begin with, the most fundamental of these propositions, the
legislature has created city councils, city commissions and village
8. Treadway v. Schnauber, 1 Dak. 227, 46 N.W. 464 (1875).
9. Lang v. Cavalier, 59 N.D. 75, 228 N.W. 819 (1930); North Fargo v. Fargo, 49
N.D. 597, 192 N.W. 977 (1923); Ashley v. Ashley Lumber Co., 40 N.D. 515, 169 N.W.
87 (1918); Stern v. Fargo, 18'N.D. 289, 122 N.W. 403 (1909).
10. Fargo v. Sathre, 76 N.D. 341, 36 N.W.2d 39 (1949); State ex rel Linde v. Taylor,
33 N.D. 76, 156 N.W. 561 (1916).
11. Lang v. Cavalier, 59 N.D. 75, 228 N.W. 819 (1930).
12. Price v. Fargo, 24 N.D. 440, 139 N.W. 1054 (1913).
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boards of trustees, collectively referred to in the law as "governing
boards". These boards consist, of course, of individual members.
But the legislature has not given powers to the individual members,
it has given these powers to the boards. Many aldermen and com-
missioners have learned to their sorrow that there is a considerable
difference between the members of the board and the board itself.
The members, it is true, constitute the board. But until the mem-
bers are assembled in a regularly convened public session, with a
full record of their acts beng kept in the journal, they are not a
board, and they have no powers. As stated by the North Dakota
Supreme Court:
"City commissioners are elected at large by the electors of the city
and form the board of commissioners. This board, when duly
assembled as such, has the right to exercise the powers conferred
by the legislature upon cities organized under the commission
form of government. No single commissioner nor group of com-
missioners acting as individuals or as a group, but not regularly
assembled as the board of city commissioners, has authority or
power to bind the municipality by his actions, representations or
declarations, unless authority to do so is actually or ostensibly
conferred upon him or them by the Board of City Commis-
sioners."1
Again, with reference to the manner in which county boards must
act (where the same rules apply), the Court quoted with approval
this graphic language of the Supreme Court of Montana:
"This board, having supervision over the official conduct of all
coutntv officers, and generally over all county business, is one of
considerable dignity and power; and the statute contemplates
that its meetings shall be held and conducted in an orderly and
businesslike way. To bind the county by its contracts, it must act,
as an entity, and within the scope of its authority. Its members
may not discharge its important governmental functions by cas-
ual sittings on drygoods boxes, or by accidental meetings on the
public streets; and its chairman, unless lawfully authorized by the
board to do some act, or acts, has no more power than has any
other member of the board. The statutes do not vest the power
of the county in three commissioners acting individually, but in
them as a single board; and the board can act only when legally
convened. And its minutes should be kept in such manner as to
give true and correct information to all inquiring concerning
county affairs."1
4
The statute provides that all meetings of the governing body shall
13. Williston v. Ludowese, 53 N.D. 797, 208 N.W. 82 (1926).
14. Rolette State Bank v. Rolette County, 56 N.D. 571, 577, 218 N.W. 637 (1928),
quoting from Williams v. Broadwater County, 28 Mont. 360, 72 Pac. 755 (1903).
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be open to the public, and that a journal of its proceedings shall be
kept." This means exactly what it says. Many governing boards,
confronted with a difficult decision and subject to the pressures of
violently contending constituents, are prone to "go into executive
session" and exclude the public. But any action taken in such an
"executive session" has no legal force or effect. There are, of course,
some rare occasions involving the good name or reputation of some
member of the board or some officer or citizen, or some other
similar matter, when it is not conducive to a full and free discussion
of the issues to have the public present. In these rare circumstances,
the proper procedure is not to have the governing board go into
"executive session" and exclude the public, but to have the govern-
ing board recess its public hearing, and go into "executive session"
as a committee of the whole. There is no requirement that com-
mittee meetings be public. This committee of the whole can meet
privately, discuss the issues, and then conclude by making a report
and recommendation to the governing board. The governing board
can then again meet in public session, receive the report of the
committee of the whole, and, in public, act upon the matter. But
even this procedure, of unquestioned legality, should be used with
the greatest caution--only in cases of very real necessity-, because
nothing is more conducive to public distrust and suspicion than
secret meetings. And on those very rare occasions when the "ex-
ecutive session" of the committee of the whole is used, care must
be taken to be sure that the official action-the final vote-, is taken
at a regularly convened public meeting.
The law requires that upon the passage of ordinances, proposi-
tions creating any liability against the city or providing for the ex-
penditure or appropriation of money, and in all other cases at the
request of any member, the "yeas" and "nays" shall be taken and
entered on the journal.16 Again, this means exactly what it says.
Official action attempted in any other manner is wholly invalid.
In a North Dakota case when an ordnance came up for second
reading and final passage, the minutes showed that at the opening
of the meeting eight aldermen (naming them) were present, which
constituted a quorum of that board. Later on in the minutes this
appeared: "[The ordinance] was read the second time and placed
upon its final passage, on call of the roll eight members voting
'Yea."' The court said:
15. N.D. Rev. Code §40-0602 (1943).
16. N.D. Rev. Code §40-1103 (1943).
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"It appears from the entries in the journal of the proceedings that
eight aldermen, whose names appear in the journal, were present
at roll call when the council assembled on July 13, 1898, but the
statute we are considering does not require entries to be made
in the journal showing who were present at the opening of a
meeting of the council. The mandate of the statute lays hold of
the very act of passing an ordinance, and when that act occurs
the statute requires the entries to be made in the official journal.
showing that the yeas and nays were called upon the passage of
the ordinance .... The decided weight of authority is that such
statutes are designed to accomplish an important public purpose
and hence their strict observance cannot be dispensed with. The
purpose of the lawmaker is to fix upon individuals personal re-
sponsibility for city legislation . . . . In the case at bar the
journal shows that when the ordinance was placed upon its
final passage the roll was called, 'eight members voting yea'. But
it will be observed that this entry in the journal conveys no in-
formation as to be personnel of the eight aldermen who cast
the affirmative vote. Their names are not given in the journal
entry. Under the authorities, no presumption of fact arises that
aldermen who were present when the council convened, and
answered to their names, remained until the vote was taken."'7
The court goes on to quote with approval the following language
of Judge Cooley in a Michigan case:
"What is designed by this statute is to fix upon each member who
takes part inl the proceedings on these resolutions the precise
share of responsibility which he ought to bear, and that by such
an unequivocal record that he shall never be able to deny either
his participation or the character of his vote. But manifestly we
cannot determine in the present case, with any certainty, that any
one of' the aldermen named-Alderman Buckhout, for example-
actually voted for the resoluticn in question. We know he was
present when the council convened, but we have no record which
points specifically to his individual action afterwards." s
Thus far it can be seen that governing boards may act only as
boards, and not individually; that action may be taken only at
regularly convened meetings-that is, the meeting must be either
a regular meeting, held at the time and place fixed by law or ordi-
nance, or a duly adjourned meeting, or a special meeting regularly
called in the manner provided by law or ordinance; that the meet-
ing must be public; that a journal of all acts must be kept; and
that upon specified matters, a "yea" and "nay" vote must be taken
and entered in the journal for all the world to see. But this is only
the beginning.
17. Pickton v. Fargo, 10 N.D. 469, 88 N.W. 90 (1901).
18. Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 103 (1870).
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Many statutes require that certain acts may be done only after
public hearing; or that certain published notices or advertisements
must precede official action; or that things must be done in a certain
order, or that contracts may be entered with only certain qualified
bidders; or that the municipality may not deal with specific in-
dividuals. A few illustrations should suffice:
Zoning ordinances may not be enacted or zoning districts amend-
ed without a public hearing. 19 Certain special assessment projects
cannot be initiated without the publication of a resolution of neces-
sitv,!.2 nor until an improvement district has been created as pro-
vided by law.2t Only a licensed public contractor can be given a
contract for public works involving the sum of $2,000 or more.-
Contracts involving the payment of money may not be entered into
with any member of a city council or any partnership, association
or corporaton of which he is a member."- It would be futile to
attempt to list all of the restrictions found in the statutes. In every
case recourse must be had to the statutes, and if any specified
method of proceeding appears, or if any special conditions are
found, the governing body must comply, or its actions will be in-
valid.
All of these restrictions and limitations may seem extremely
onerouE, but they are inherent in the very nature of municipal cor-
porations as the repositories of a limited portiorq of the sovereign
power of the state. They are binding alike upon the representatives
of the municipality and upon those who do business with the muni-
cipality. One dealing with a municipal corporation is presumed to
known the extent of its powers, and he may not impose a liability
upon it because of representations or contracts of its officers con-
cerning matters not legally within its corporate powers.2 4
PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE OF GOVERNING BOARDS
Most governing boards have adopted a set of rules of procedure
for governing and for the purpose of promoting the orderly conduct
of meetings. Some are rather elaborate, while others simply refer
to Robert's Rules of Order or some other standard work. In either
19.- N.D. Rev. Code §40-4705 et seq. (1943).
20. N.D. Rev. Code §40-2215 (1943).
21. N.D. Rev. Code §40-2208 (1943); Boynton v. Board of County Commissioners,
54 N.D. 795, 211 N.W. 441 (1926).
22. N.D. Rev. Code §§43-0701, 43-0702 (1943).
23. N.D. Rev. Code 140-0809 (1943).
24. Hart V. Wyndmere, 21 N.D. 383, 131 N.W. 271 (1911); Roberts v. Fargo,
10 N.D. 230, 86 N.W. 726 (1901).
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case, such parliamentary rules are no more than a guide to proper
practice. If all of the statutory requirements have been met; if all
sides have had a fair opportunity to present their case; if no artifice
has been used to deprive anyone of his voice or his vote; and if
the question has been fairly presented and voted upon, the courts
will not interest themselves in technical questions involving the
niceties o fparliamentary law. The important thing is not the route
or the procedure by which a proposal reached the point for final
action, but whether it was voted on in the manner required by law
by the requisite number of members of the board after a fair oppor-
tunity to present argument, amendments or counter-proposals. As
stated by the North Dakota Supreme Court many years ago:
"But it cannot be said that every violation of parliamentary usage
will annul the action of the body guilty of such irregularity. The
course of procedure rests largely with the discretion of the major-
ity, provided the course adopted affords a reasonable guaranty
that the sense of the body on the particular measure before it has
been fairly taken. In large bodies, slight deviations from estab-
lished practice might be fatal, because, in such bodies, the con-
fusion consequent on departure from settled modes of transacting
business may seriously impair or utterly destroy the rights of the
minority to be heard in argument, to the end that they may con-
vert an adverse majority into a minority. But, in smaller bodies-
one, for instance, composed of five members, sitting around the
same table, each under the eye and within reach of the voice of
every other member -a strict observance of all the formalities
prescribed by parliamentary usages is not necessary. The question
for the court in such cases is whether, in view of the size of the
body, the proceedings which were had resulting in the adoption
of the motion before the body afford a guaranty that the sense
of that body was fairly taken on that particular motion."'5
LIABILITY FOR OFFICIAL ACTS
The circumstances in which a member of a governing board
could become personally liable, civilly or criminally, for official
action are extremely limited. Of course, by participating in any
action resulting in the unlawful appropriation of public money to
himself or to any other person, a board member would make him-
self liable, both civilly and criminally. But as a general proposition,
for his vote and action in board meetings, a member is responsible
only to his conscience and to his constituents.2 6 No matter how mis-
taken may be his judgment, that judgment is not subject to legal
25. State v. Archibald, 5 N.D. 359, 66 N.W. 234 (1896).
26. Holgerson v. Devils Lake, 63 N.D. 155, 246 N.W. 641 (1933).
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control when he acts as a member of the board. Fortunately, all of
us have the God-given right to make mistakes, or the jails of the
country could not accomodate us.
But the possible liability of the municipality for a board mem-
ber's mistaken acts or omissions is quite a different proposition.
This question of municipal liablility is one which has given the
courts an unlimited amount of trouble. The fundamental basis of
all of the decisions is easily stated, but in practice, it is difficult to
apply. The rule is that municipalities are not liable for torts arising
out of the performance of governmental functions; they are liable
for torts arising out of the performance of proprietary or business
functions. It is in the application of the rule that trouble arises. Of
course, those troubles cannot be solved here, but a few illustrations
may be of assistance.
It is uniformly held that for enacting, enforcing or failing to en-
force. a police ordinance there is no municipal liability.27 North
Dakota cases involving acts which have been held to be govern-
mental in their nature, and for which no municipal liability exists,
are cases involving the maintenance of a sewer system;2 8 careless
driviag by a police officer in the performance of his duty;29 main-
tenauce of a garbage collection system; '  a public dump grounds;'
a park board maintaining a toboggan slide;32 and a school board
maintaining playground apparatus.33
As examples of things held to be proprietary functions, thereby
giving rise to municipal liability, the following cases from other
states may furnish a clue as to what the North Dakota courts might
hold: Irrigation canals;34 electric light and water 35 supplying ice to
offices in city auditorium; 6 public utilities;17 and municipal street
railway."'
In all cases it is held that liability exists in the case of torts or
negligent acts of employees in connecton with business or proprie-
tary functions, and that no liability exists in connection with gov-
27. Hanson v. Berry, 54 N.D. 487, 209 N.W. 1002 (1926).
28. Hamilton v. Bismarck, 71 N.D. 321, 300 N.W. 631 (1941).
29. Hanson v. Berry, 54 N.D. 487, 209 N.W. 1002 (1926).
30. Montain v. Fargo, 38 N.D. 432, 166 N.W. 416 (1917).
31. Moulton v. Fargo, 39 N.D. 502, 167 N.W. 717 (1917).
32. Holgerson v. Devils Lake, 63 N.D. 155, 246 N.W. 641 (1933).
33. Anderson v. Board of Education, 49 N.D. 181, 190 N.W. 807 (1922).
34. Newman v. Bitter Root Irr. Dist., 95 Mont. 521, 28 P.2d 195 (1933).
35. Montgomery v. Athens, 229 Ala. 149, 155 So. 551 (1934).
36. Wichita Falls v. Lewis, 68 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
37. San Antonio 1. Sch. Dist. v. Water Works Bd. of Trustees, 120 S.W.2d 861 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1938).
38. Kornahrens v. San Francisco, 87 Cal. App.2d 196, 196 P.2d 140 (1948).
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ernmental functions.'9 The rule is clear, but its application is diffi-
cult-as can be seen by one illustration: Suppose a city had a
municipal light plant furnishing light not only for city purposes,
but also selling electricity to the public. The reasoning of the cases
would indicate that liability would exist for torts arising out of
furnishing current to the public generally, but that no liability
would exist in cases arising out of the negligent lighting of the
streets or public places.40 In only one field is this rule departed
from. The maintenance of streets and sidewalks, clearly, is a gov-
ernriental function. But, because the statutes and law cast a direct
responsibility on the municipality to maintain its streets and side-
walks in a safe condition for the public, the municipality is held to
be liable for damages resulting from their unsafe conditions.41
The foregoing discussion has been directed solely toward the
liability of the municipality for the negligent or tortious conduct of
its agents and servants in carrying out their duties. So far as the in-
dividual officer or employee is concerned, if he, personally, is guilty
of negligent or tortious conduct, the fact that he was engaged in
governmentol business at the time does not relieve him of liability.
39. Peavey v. Miami, 146 Fla. 629, 1 S.2d 614 (1941).
40. Abbott v. Des Moines, 230 Ia. 494, 298 N.W. 649 (1941)
.
41. Ludlow v. Fargo, 3 N.D. 485, 57 N.W. 506 (1893).
